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Abstract
We identify the cyclical turning points of 74 U.S. manufacturing industries and
uncover new empirical regularities: (i) Cyclical phase shifts are highly concentrated
around the aggregate turning points; (ii) In contrast to the conventional notion of
a ‘sudden stop and slow recovery,’ troughs are much more concentrated than peaks;
(iii) Occurrences of phase shifts across industries support the spillovers through
input-output linkages; (iv) The common macroeconomic shocks, such as exogenous
changes in the federal funds rate, government spending, and oil prices, are signiﬁcant
drivers of industrial phase shifts; (v) Both monetary and ﬁscal policy shocks are more
eﬀective in recessions.
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The comovement of industries over the business cycle is a salient feature of market
economies (Burns and Mitchell, 1946; Lucas, 1977). The empirical pattern of industrial
comovement is of profound importance because it forms the basis for modern (one- or multi-
sector) business cycle models. While there has been a great deal of empirical work on such
comovement, most existing studies have focused on just correlation coeﬃcients.1 In contrast,
relatively little is known about the comovement of phase shifts across industries, while the
concentration of cyclical phases is a cornerstone of the classical deﬁnition of the cyclical
comovement, suggested by Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 70):
A period in which expansions are concentrated is succeeded by another in which
cyclical peaks are concentrated, by another in which contractions are concen-
trated, by another in which cyclical troughs are concentrated; and this round of
events is repeated again and again.
The objective of this article is to examine the patterns and sources of the comovement
of phase shifts across industries. The timing of turning points (rather than correlations) is
of great interest to policy makers, ﬁnancial analysts, as well as individual investors. The
new empirical regularities that we uncover will help us to better understand the sources
and propagation of aggregate business cycles. We ﬁnd the following: (i) Cyclical phases are
highly concentrated around the aggregate business cycle; (ii) The distribution of industry
troughs (upturns) is much more concentrated than that of industry peaks (downturns);
(iii) Occurrences of phase shifts across industries strongly support the spillovers through
input-output linkages, a core aspect of multi-sector models; (iv) The standard common
macroeconomic shocks, such as exogenous changes in the federal funds rate, government
1For the correlations between industrial growth rates, see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Long
and Plosser (1987), Shea (2002), Conley and Dupor (2003), and Foerster, Sarte and Watson (forthcoming).
For the correlations between detrended industrial variables, see Cooper and Haltiwanger (1990), Christiano
and Fitzgerald (1998), Hornstein (2000), Horvath (2000), Kim and Kim (2006), and Veldkamp and Wolfers
(2007).
1spending, and oil prices, are all signiﬁcant drivers of phase shifts at the industry level; (v)
Both monetary and ﬁscal policy shocks are more eﬀective in recessions.
We ﬁrst identify industrial turning points using a nonparametric dating algorithm pro-
posed by Harding and Pagan (2002), which is applied to quarterly production indices for
74 U.S. manufacturing industries. The diﬀusion and concordance analyses then indicate a
strong comovement of phase shifts across industries. But more interesting from our point
of view is the asymmetric concentration of clusters between industry peaks and troughs:
industry troughs are much more concentrated than industry peaks. This result is robust to
various treatments of the data. Our ﬁnding of a higher concentration of troughs is in contrast
to the conventional notion of a ‘sudden stop and slow recovery’ dating back to Keynes (1936,
p. 314): “The substitution of a downward for an upward tendency often takes place suddenly
and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning point when an upward is
substituted for a downward tendency.” Our result is instead consistent with ‘sharp’ troughs
and ‘round’ peaks, as documented by McQueen and Thorley (1993).
We then proceed by investigating the determinants of the industry comovement of phase
shifts. We consider two groups of explanatory variables that economic theories suggest are
important: spillovers from input-output linkages and common macroeconomic shocks.2 We
distinguish upstream (demand-side) and downstream (supply-side) spillover eﬀects, both of
which are measured based on the input-output matrix. A novelty of our approach is that
a spillover eﬀect is identiﬁed by the change in the probability of an industry experiencing a
phase shift resulting from past phase shifts in its neighbor industries.3 Three macroeconomic
shocks considered are (i) Romer and Romer’s (2004) indicator of monetary policy shocks, (ii)
Ramey’s (forthcoming) measure of government spending shocks, and (iii) Hamilton’s (2003)
2See Long and Plosser (1983), Hornstein and Praschnik (1997), Horvath (2000), and Carvalho (2010) for
a discussion justifying the role of input-output linkages and Lucas (1977) and Dupor (1999) for a discussion
of the importance of aggregate shocks.
3Although this approach is new in the industry comovement literature, similar approaches are frequently
used in literatures on infectious disease epidemiology (e.g., Padian et al., 1997), ﬁnancial crisis contagion
(e.g., Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1996), and knowledge and technology spillovers (e.g., Goolsbee and
Klenow, 2002).
2oil price shocks. According to our panel data probit estimation, all of these two groups of
explanatory variables have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the occurrences of industry
phase shifts, conﬁrming our economic priors. In addition, both monetary and government
spending shocks are shown to have a much greater eﬀect in recessions than in expansions.
Our work contributes to various bodies of literature in the following ways. First, we
provide a new empirical characterization of industry comovement. Compared to previous
studies focusing only on the correlation coeﬃcient between industries, we provide a more
comprehensive picture about the dynamics of industry comovement by demonstrating how
the concentration of cyclical phases changes over the course of business cycles.
Second, among previous empirical studies on the determinants of industry comovement,
the closest to our work are Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994), Shea (2002), and Holly
and Petrella (2010). While these papers have focused on to what extent the growth rates of
industrial variables are aﬀected by changes in the sources of comovement—namely, aggregate
shocks and spillovers from input-output linkages, our emphasis is instead on the dynamic
responses of the probabilities of industry phase shifts.
Third, our work complements recent studies that ﬁnd stronger output eﬀects of monetary
and ﬁscal policies in recessions; Weise (1999), Lo and Piger (2005), and Peersman and Smets
(2005) for monetary policy, and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009), Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2010), Bachmann and Sims (2011), and Woodford (forthcoming) for ﬁscal
policy. Although the general message of our analysis seems in line with these studies, we
ﬁnd such asymmetric policy eﬀects with respect to phase shifts at the industry level.
Fourth, we oﬀer a new dimension to the analysis of business cycle asymmetries. Tradi-
tionally, studies of business cycle asymmetry have been concentrated on the ﬁrst-moment
properties of the ﬂuctuations in aggregate economic activity. Typical examples are the
asymmetries associated with durations and steepness of business cycle expansions and con-
tractions.4 More recently, increasing attention has been paid to the cyclical properties of
4See Morley (2009) for an extensive summary.
3the cross-sectional dispersion in ﬁrm- or industry-level growth rates; e.g., Higson, Holly and
Kattuman (2002), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), Bachmann and Bayer (2009), Bloom, Floe-
totto and Jaimovich (2010), and Kehrig (2011). Relative to these papers, we focus on the
asymmetric concentration of industry turning points between national peaks and troughs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the
methodology used for dating the industry-speciﬁc cycles. Section 3 presents the results of
conformity analysis. Empirical results for the asymmetric concentration of industry turning
points are given in Section 4. In Section 5 we carry out a panel probit analysis to investigate
the determinants of inter-industry comovement. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2. Dating Industry Cycles
2.1. Algorithm
In order to identify turning points in the individual industry cycles we apply Harding and
Pagan’s (2002) algorithm to the level of industrial output. Using this approach has at least
three advantages. First, it does not require a particular deﬁnition of trend components from
the raw series, avoiding potential problems inherent in de-trending methods.5 Second, using
a level series is consistent with the practice maintained by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating
Committee, which has provided the most authoritative chronology for U.S. business cycles.
Third, it is consistent with many previous studies seeking to establish business cycle features
based on ‘aggregate’ level time series data (e.g., King and Plosser, 1994; Watson, 1994; Hess
and Iwata, 1997; Harding and Pagan, 2002). One of the (potential) shortcomings is that
it may fail to detect a turning point in a series with a strong upward or downward trend.
Hence, we will check the robustness of our results by considering detrended data from the
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter where appropriate.
5For example, Harvey and Jaeger (1993) and Cogley and Nason (1995) provide analyses of spurious
cycles arising from the application of the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Canova (1998) illustrates how the diﬀerent
de-trending methods generate diﬀerent ‘stylized facts’ of U.S. business cycles.
4The implementation of Harding and Pagan (2002), which is a quarterly variant of the
Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm, involves the following stages:
1. Deﬁne a peak in a time series fytg
T
t=1 as occurring at time t if yt =
maxfyt 2;yt 1;yt;yt+1;yt+2g and a trough as occurring at time t if yt =
minfyt 2;yt 1;yt;yt+1;yt+2g. That is, a peak (trough) occurs at time t if yt is higher
(lower) than its two preceding and two succeeding observations.
2. Check whether these peaks and troughs satisfy the predetermined ‘censoring rules’ as
described below.
Censoring rules make sure that (i) peaks and troughs alternate and that (ii) a phase and
a complete cycle have minimum durations. If these requirements are not fulﬁlled, the least
pronounced among adjacent turning points is eliminated. In this paper, we set the minimum
duration of a phase to be 2 quarters and that of a cycle to be 5 quarters.6
We use disaggregated industrial production (IP) data extracted from the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. The data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted and
run from 1972:Q1 through 2010:Q2. In our data the U.S. manufacturing sector is classiﬁed
into 74 industries that correspond roughly to the 4-digit level of disaggregation in the 2002
North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).7
Before we turn to the industry cycle analysis, Figure 1 compares the NBER business
cycle dates to those identiﬁed by the Harding-Pagan method applied to the log level of U.S.
real GDP for the period 1947:Q1–2010:Q2. The Harding-Pagan algorithm identiﬁes 10 of
the 11 NBER recessions during this period. The only one that the Harding-Pagan algorithm
misses is the 2001 recession, which was a very mild one. Furthermore, in most cases, the two
business cycle dates are very close to each other. For instance, for the most recent 2007–09
6The minimum duration requirement for a phase also prevents a turning point from occurring in the ﬁrst
and last two quarters of the sample.
7Seventy industries correspond exactly to the 4-digit NAICS. Four industries are at the 3-digit level. They
are apparel (NAICS 315), leather and allied products (NAICS 316), printing and related support activities
(NAICS 323), and petroleum and coal products (NAICS 324).
5recession, the Harding-Pagan algorithm selects the exact same peak and trough dates as
those identiﬁed by the NBER.8
2.2. Frequencies and Durations of Industry Cycles
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for frequencies and durations of industry cycles
identiﬁed by the Harding-Pagan algorithm applied to quarterly log IP indices. For compar-
ison, we include the corresponding statistics for the aggregate business cycle based on the
NBER dates. The number and duration of whole cycles are measured from trough to trough.
Employing peak-to-peak measures does not change the general features.
Manufacturing industries have experienced more frequent phase shifts than the U.S.
economy. During the sample period of 1972:Q1–2010:Q2, the U.S. economy experienced
5 trough-to-trough cycles, whereas manufacturing industries on average experienced 10.3
cycles. Consequently, the average duration of complete cycles is much shorter for man-
ufacturing industries (14.2 quarters) than for the U.S. economy (27.4 quarters). Though
less pronounced than for the U.S. economy, manufacturing industries also exhibit duration
asymmetries between expansions and contractions. The average duration of expansions (8.7
quarters) is about twice as long as that of recessions (5.3 quarters) for manufacturing indus-
tries, while the same ratio for the U.S. economy is 6.2.
There are large cross-sectional diﬀerences in the duration properties of industry cycles.
For example, the average duration of production cycles goes up to 34 quarters in the computer
and peripheral equipment industry (NAICS 3341), while it drops to 8.3 quarters in the other
transportation equipment industry (NAICS 3369). The semiconductor and other electronic
components industry (NAICS 3344) experiences, on average, the longest expansion, with a
duration of 31.3 quarters, which is in sharp contrast to the minimum expansion duration of
3.8 quarters recorded for the apparel industry (NAICS 315). The cross-sectional diﬀerences
8Despite this similarity, it is important to note that the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee indeed
has no ﬁxed rule to determine turning point dates in U.S. economic activity. A detailed description of the
NBER’s business cycle dating procedure is available at www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html.
6in duration asymmetries are also quite striking. The average duration of expansions, for
instance, is ten times longer than that of recessions for the semiconductor and other electronic
component industry (NAICS 3344), while it is just one-half of that of recessions for the
apparel industry (NAICS 315).
3. Comovement: Diﬀusion and Concordance
In spite of the large cross-sectional diﬀerences in the duration properties, phase shifts
tend to coincide across industries. To quantify the degree of concentration of cyclical phases
we adopt two measures of comovement: diﬀusion and concordance indices.
The diﬀusion index measures the fraction of industries sharing the same phase at a given







wit = 1; t = 1;:::;T; (1)
where wit is the weight assigned to ith industry at time t, Sit is a binary variable taking
the value of 1 if the ith industry is in a contraction and 0 otherwise, and N is the cross-
sectional dimension. We use two measures of industry weights: equal shares for all industries
and the (time-varying) output share of each industry available from the Federal Reserve
Board. Constructed in this way, the diﬀusion index for contraction measures how widely
contractions are spread in the manufacturing sector, in terms of (i) the number of industries
(equal weights) and (ii) the amount of production (output-share weights). The diﬀusion
index for expansion is simply one minus the diﬀusion index for contraction.
The upper and lower panels of Figure 2 display the diﬀusion indices for contraction and
expansion phases, respectively. The fraction of industries experiencing a contraction rises
sharply during every NBER recession period, while it remains low during NBER expansion
periods. More precisely, the average fraction of industries in contraction is 73.1% for the
NBER recessions and 33.6% for the NBER expansions when equal weights are used. By
7contrast, the fraction of industries experiencing an expansion stays far above 50% for most
of the NBER expansion periods and sharply drops below 50% at the beginning of the NBER
recessions. The average fraction of industries undergoing an expansion is 66.4% for the NBER
expansions and 26.9% for the NBER recessions when equal weights are used. Note that the
choice between the two weighting methods does not substantially aﬀect these patterns.
The two NBER recessions in 1973–75 and 2007–09 deserve special attention, since the
diﬀusion index for contraction rises to nearly 1 during these periods. This indicates that
almost all industries experienced declines in the levels of production during these national
recessions. In contrast, during other NBER recessions—1980, 1981–82, 1990–91, and 2001—
about 30% of industries continued to increase their production. The ﬁgure also shows that
there are several periods (i.e., 1984–85, 1995–96, and 2003) when a considerable number of
industries experienced a contraction, while the U.S. economy as a whole did not.
Our second measure of comovement, the concordance index, measures the fraction of time
that two cycles are in the same phase over the sample period. This index can be used in two






[SitSjt + (1   Sit)(1   Sjt)]; (2)
where Sit and Sjt are binary variables indicating contractions of industry i and j, respectively.






[SitSUS;t + (1   Sit)(1   SUS;t)]; (3)
where SUS;t is a dummy variable indicating the NBER recession dates.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the concordance indices computed over (i) all
the 2,701 (74  73=2) pairwise combinations of industries (Pairwise) and (ii) the 74 pairs
between industry cycles and the U.S. business cycles deﬁned by the NBER (NBER). From
this table it is apparent that there is a high degree of concordance across industries. The
8pairwise concordance indices range from 0.344 to 0.864, with a mean of 0.607, suggesting
that any pair of industries are in the same cyclical phase about 60.7% of the time. The
degree of concordance between individual industries and the aggregate U.S. economy is on
average 0.674.9 Taken jointly, the patterns of the two measures constructed in this section
clearly conﬁrm that comovement across industries is a salient feature of U.S. business cycles.
4. Distribution of Turning Points
4.1. Concentration Asymmetry
We now ask whether the distributions of industry turning points have the same con-
centration between the NBER peaks and troughs. To shed light on this issue, we deﬁne a
turning point cluster as a set of industry turning points whose distances from given NBER
turning points are less than a predetermined bound (for example, 8 quarters). Formally, the
cluster is deﬁned as follows. Let P
ij be the jth peak of industry i and mk be the kth peak in




ij j d(mk   
P
ij) < d(m`   
P
ij) for all ` 6= k; and d(mk   
P
ij)   dg; (4)
where d() is a measure of distance and  d is a predetermined cluster bound. Following
Harding and Pagan (2006), we choose  d = 8 for our quarterly data. Clusters of industry
9The concordance index has a shortcoming in that it is positively aﬀected by the expected values of
the phase indicators. To address this problem, we checked our results using the mean-corrected correlation
index proposed by Harding and Pagan (2006). The results also indicated that most industries are positively
synchronized with other industries, as well as with the aggregate economy. The results are available upon
request.
10This deﬁnition is based on Harding and Pagan (2006). The major diﬀerence between their work and
ours is that they use this deﬁnition to extract the reference cycle dates, which are assumed to be unknown
a priori, while we employ the NBER dates as the business cycle reference dates for the U.S. economy. Note
that our focus is not on how to identify a common cycle, but on how the peaks and troughs of industry
cycles are distributed around the business cycle turning points.
9troughs are deﬁned in a similar fashion.11
Figure 3 displays histograms of peak and trough clusters. The horizontal axis denotes
the lead (negative) and lag (positive) time over the NBER turning point dates. The vertical
axis is the corresponding fraction of industries, averaged separately over the past 6 NBER
peak and trough dates. Inspection of this ﬁgure reveals sharp contrasts between the shapes
of peak and trough clusters.
First, clusters of industry troughs are highly concentrated at the NBER trough date,
whereas clusters of industry peaks are much more dispersed. For troughs, more than 33%
of industries, on average, exit simultaneously from the contraction phase at the NBER
trough date. For peaks, just about 14% of industries newly enter the contraction phase
at the NBER peak date. Second, peak clusters are skewed toward leads, whereas trough
clusters tend to be skewed to lags. For troughs, the sums of the industry fractions over the
left and right sides of the cluster are 36.7% and 57.7%, respectively. In peak clusters, the
respective ratios are 80.0% and 38.8%.12 According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test using
exact p values (Higgins, 2004), the null hypothesis of equal distribution between the peak
and trough clusters is rejected at the 1% level.13
These asymmetric patterns of peak and trough distributions have emerged consistently
over the last 6 NBER recessions. As Figure 4 shows, the fraction of coincident industries
has almost always been more than twice as large at the NBER trough dates than at the
NBER peak dates. One exception was the 1981–82 recession, for which this ratio is reduced
11It is important to note that the above deﬁnition allows an industry turning point to appear in at most
one cluster. This restriction limits the maximum lag for the 1980 peak and the maximum lead for the 1981
peak to 2 quarters; and the the maximum lag for the 1980 trough and the maximum lead for the 1982 trough
to 4 quarters. In addition, due to data availability, the maximum lead for the 1973 peak and the maximum
lag for the 2009 trough are reduced to 5 and 2 quarters, respectively. Hence careful attention needs to be paid
to the results for the points that miss observations for some clusters. However, as will be seen from Figure
4 below, which displays the turning point distributions for each NBER recession, our conclusion about the
general shapes of clusters does not appear to be sensitive to these partial truncations.
12Note that for neither the peak nor the trough clusters is the sum of the fractions of industries necessarily
equal to one. This is because (i) some industries do not experience any cyclical turns during the time period
spanned by the cluster, and because (ii) some industries experience muliple turns during the same time
period.
13We adopt the randomized permutation test for exact inference, since our data on lead and lag times are
discretely recorded on a quarterly basis.
10to 1.2. The maximum ratio was 6.25 for the 2001 recession, and for the most recent 2007–09
recession, this ratio was 3.29. With respect to the skewness properties, industry peaks have
always been skewed toward leads except for the 1973 NBER peak. Industry troughs have
been skewed toward lags except for the 1980 trough.
To check the robustness of asymmetric distribution of peaks and troughs, we use diﬀerent
level of aggregation in Figure 5. We break down the manufacturing sector into (i) 21 3-digit
industries and (ii) 116 industries whose IP indices are available in the most disaggregated
level up to the 6-digit level.14 In any case, the asymmetric shape of the distribution is very
similar to Figure 3 based on 74 4-digit industries.
We also repeat the above dating and clustering analysis using the detrended IP series
from the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Following Kydland and Prescott (1990) and Harvey and
Jaeger (1993), we set the relative variance of the trend component equal to 0.000625 to
apply the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to our quarterly time series. The resulting distributions of
industry peaks and troughs are displayed in Figure 6. The general shapes of both peak and
trough clusters are almost identical to what we have found using the level series; troughs are
much more concentrated than peaks. The exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov test strongly rejects
the null hypothesis of equal distribution between peak and trough clusters regardless of the
level of aggregation or the de-trending method we use.
4.2. Uncovering Leading Industries
Based on the industry turning points we just identiﬁed, we uncover the leading indus-
tries over the business cycle. We classify industries into leading, coincident, lagging, and
acyclical groups for each NBER peak and trough dates based on the clusters. We deﬁne
the leading industries as those whose turning points came earlier than the NBER turning
points. Consistent with the previous clustering analysis, we restrict the maximum lead time
to 8 quarters. Coincident industries are those whose turning points coincide with the NBER
14Among the 116 industries we consider, the number of 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-digit industries is 3, 45, 36, and
32, respectively.
11turning points. If an industry does not experience a cyclical turning point during the time
period spanned by the cluster, we deﬁne it as acyclical.15
Table 3 summarizes the transition probability matrices, estimated separately over the
NBER peak and trough dates. The ijth element in the upper (lower) panel of the matrix
represents the probability of moving from group i to group j between two adjacent NBER
peaks (troughs). Thus, the elements of each row sum to 1 and the diagonal elements represent
persistence of a group. For the NBER peak dates, we ﬁnd a strong persistence among
leading industries (0.613), reﬂecting that many manufacturing industries tend to lead the
aggregate peaks. But we ﬁnd little persistence among coincident (0.089) and lagging (0.107)
industries. On the contrary, for the NBER trough dates, we see much less persistence (0.3)
for leading industries, whereas the coincident (0.336) and lagging groups (0.346) display
higher persistence.
Table 4 lists the industries that have led, lagged, and coincided with the U.S. business
cycle on more than 3 occasions over the past 6 NBER peak dates (50% or higher).16 For the
NBER peak dates, 30 (20 durables and 10 nondurables) of the 74 industries are deﬁned as
leading industries according to the 50% cutoﬀ rule.17 We ﬁnd that 3 industries—cutlery and
handtool (NAICS 3322), motor vehicle (NAICS 3361), and furniture and kitchen cabinet
(NAICS 3371)—have led all NBER peaks in the past 6 recessions. By comparison, when
the same cutoﬀ rule is used, no industry is deﬁned as coincident, and only 2 industries are
deﬁned as lagging.
The same list for troughs is presented in Table 5. For the NBER trough dates, the corre-
sponding number of leading industries is signiﬁcantly reduced to 3—medical equipment and
supplies (NAICS 3391), sugar and confectionery product (NAICS 3113), and sawmills and
15Note that an industry may experience multiple peaks (troughs) during the time period spanned by a
peak (trough) cluster. In this situation, we consider minimum distance criterion; that is, for instance, if an
industry exhibits two peaks, of which one is marked in the left and the other is marked in the right half of
the cluster, and if the lead time is shorter than the lag time, then we classify the industry as leading.
16The classiﬁcation of industries in Tables 4 and 5 is just for expository purposes and not based on rigorous
statistical tests. We leave more rigorous statistical testing to follow-up studies.
17The classiﬁcation between durables and nondurables is based on the deﬁnition by the Federal Reserve
Board.
12wood preservation (NAICS 3211)—partially reﬂecting a highly concentrated distribution of
troughs, whereas those of coincident and lagging industries increase to 10 and 12, respec-
tively. Interestingly, among the 3 leading industries of the NBER troughs, only the sawmills
and wood preservation industry (NAICS 3211) is also identiﬁed as a leading industry for the
NBER peaks in Table 4.
4.3. On Relation to Sharpness Asymmetry
Our ﬁnding of a higher concentration of troughs (upturns) is in contrast to the conven-
tional notion of a ‘sudden stop and slow recovery’ dating back at least to Keynes (1936). Our
empirical ﬁndings are, however, consistent with the characterization of sharpness asymmetry
documented in McQueen and Thorley (1993).18 Our analysis helps us to further decompose
the sharpness asymmetry into two sources: sharpness asymmetry at the individual industry
level and the composition eﬀect due to the concentration asymmetry.
To illustrate the decomposition, suppose that for each group of industries, curvatures
(sharpness) of IP indices are the same between the NBER peaks and troughs. If the frac-
tions of coincident industries are higher at the NBER troughs than at the NBER peaks
(as we found), then sharpness asymmetry may arise at the aggregate level even if there is
no sharpness asymmetry at the individual group level. (According to our analysis below,
the curvatures for coincident industries tend to be sharper than those of non-coincidental
industries at both the NBER peaks and troughs.)
Table 6 compares the degrees of sharpness asymmetry between coincident and other in-
dustries. Following McQueen and Thorley (1993), we measure the sharpness of IP changes
by the mean absolute diﬀerence between changes in the log IP during the two quarters end-
ing in the NBER turning points and those during the two following quarters. Sharpness
asymmetry is then measured by the diﬀerence in sharpness between the NBER troughs and
peaks. First, the manufacturing sector also supports the notion of sharpness asymmetry at
18Hicks (1950, p. 101) also noted that “falls in output do not induce disinvestment in the same way as rises
in output induce investment. There is a marked lack of symmetry.”
13the aggregate level; the mean sharpness for the aggregate manufacturing industry is 0.062
at the NBER peaks and 0.126 at the NBER troughs, suggesting that the curvature of the
aggregate IP index is on average twice as sharp at the NBER troughs than at the NBER
peaks. It also shows that coincident industries tend to exhibit sharper changes than other
industries, at both NBER peaks and troughs. When we look at the leading, coincident, lag-
ging, and acyclical industries separately, the sharpness asymmetry is still evident among the
individual groups of industries. All groups except for acyclical industries exhibit signiﬁcant
sharpness asymmetry, and the most profound asymmetry is found in coincident industries.
We decompose sharpness asymmetry at the aggregate level as
ST   SP =
2 X
g=1
















where the subscript g distinguishes coincident industries (g = 1) from other groups (g =
2), P and T indicate that the statistics are constructed at the NBER peaks and troughs,
respectively, w denotes the fraction of industries belonging to each group, and S denotes the
sharpness for each group at the NBER turning point dates.
Table 7 reports each term from this decomposition estimated separately for each of the
past NBER recessions. According to the decomposition, it is the individual-group-level
characteristic that accounts for the lion’s share of sharpness asymmetry observed at the
aggregate level. However, concentration asymmetry also plays a signiﬁcant role. It accounts
for, on average, 24.3% of the aggregate-level sharpness asymmetry with its least contribution
of 9.2% for the 1981–82 recession, and the largest of 74.6% for the 2001 recession.
5. Determinants of Comovement
In this section we investigate what determines the interindustry comovement. Speciﬁcally,
we ask whether common macroeconomic shocks and inter-industry linkages, emphasized by
14the existing literature as two main sources of the comovement, are important for the concur-
rence of industry turning points. We also examine whether the eﬀects of these determinants
are (a)symmetric between the occurrences of peaks and troughs.
5.1. Empirical Model
For the occurrence of a peak, the empirical model is
dit = 1(X
0
it + uit > 0); for i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T, (6)
where dit is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if industry i is at a peak at time t
and otherwise takes the value of 0; 1() denotes an indicator function that is equal to 1 if
the condition in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise; Xit is a vector of observable covariates;
 is a vector of index coeﬃcients; and uit is a residual term. The model for the occurrence
of a trough can be speciﬁed in a similar way.
We assume that uit has the following structure:
uit = i + it; (7)
where i is an industry-speciﬁc time-invariant component that captures unobserved hetero-
geneity in the mean duration of expansion phases, and it is an idiosyncratic disturbance
that changes across t as well as i. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we assume that both i and
it are independent from Xit and distributed as i  N(0;2
) and it  i.i.d.N(0;1), respec-
tively. This assumption allows for a random eﬀects approach. In the robustness subsection,
we discuss whether diﬀerent assumptions about the error structure would aﬀect the results.

















where Prob(ditjXit;it;sit;) = (X0
it+i)dit[1 (X0
it+i)]1 dit if sit = 0 and 1 if sit = 1;
sit is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 where a peak cannot appear (i.e., dit = 0
with a probability of 1) because of the censoring rule we employ and takes the value of 0
elsewhere;19 and () and () are the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution,
respectively.20 We use a 12-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the integral
over i (see, e.g., Butler and Moﬃtt, 1982).
As explained in the introduction, our approach signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the previous
studies on the comovement of industries in that we deal with the discrete event variables
rather than continuous variables like the growth rates of IP indices. Our approach is also
distinguishable from the existing studies trying to predict recessions using a binary response
time-series model (e.g., Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Harding and Pagan, 2011). First, we
use a panel data model instead of an aggregate-level time-series model. This choice of model
is expected to improve the statistical power of the analysis. Second, while the previous
studies have used a binary series representing cyclical phases per se, we use binary series
that mark the end of the cyclical phases (i.e., peaks and troughs). This choice enables us to
evaluate whether the determinants of comovement have (a)symmetric eﬀects between peaks
and troughs.21 In addition, this approach provides a convenient way to avoid the state
dependence problem associated with the constructed binary time series (see Harding and
Pagan, 2011), since unlike the cyclical phase itself that is expected to persist over several
19To be more concrete, in the case of peak equation, sit = 1 for a given industry i if t falls in one of the
ﬁrst two quarters of the sample period, the ﬁrst four quarters after a previous peak, one quarter after a
previous trough, and the quarters identiﬁed as a contraction phase.
20Thus, we assume a probit speciﬁcation in our baseline analysis.
21When we use a binary variable that equals 1 if the economy is in contraction and 0 in expansion, as in
the previous work, the probability of expansion is automatically calculated as one minus the probability of
contraction. Thus, we cannot separately estimate the responses of the probabilities of expansions from those
of contractions.
16quarters, the end of a phase cannot happen consecutively.
5.2. Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables are grouped into two categories. The ﬁrst group consists of





where dj;t p is a dummy variable assigning the value 1 to industry j’s peak (in the case of
peak equation) or trough (in the case of trough equation) having occurred at time t   p
(1  p  pmax), and wij is a weight capturing the importance of industry j for industry i.
Following Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994) and Shea (2002), we distinguish
spillover eﬀects depending on the origins of the eﬀects. The ﬁrst is from output users (up-
stream or demand-side), and the second is from input suppliers (downstream or supply-side).
Let mij be the value of a commodity (in producers’ prices) produced by industry i and used











To measure these two types of weights, we use the Benchmark Input-Output tables provided
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).22 In contrast to IP data, which are disaggregated
by the NAICS system, the input-output tables for years prior to 1997 are available based
only on the Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) system. Since there is no easy way to
22We make use of the “Use Tables” at the detailed level, available at www.bea.gov/industry/io_
benchmark.htm.
17convert them to the NAICS codes, we use constant weights drawn from the input-output
table for 1997.
The second group of explanatory variables consists of three diﬀerent macroeconomic
shocks, all of which are known to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on aggregate output.
The ﬁrst is Romer and Romer’s (2004) indicator of monetary policy shocks, derived as
changes in the Federal Reserve’s target for the federal funds rate, not taken in response to
information about future inﬂation and real growth. The second is Ramey’s (forthcoming)
measure of government spending shocks, which is the present value of expected changes in
future defense spending (as a percent of nominal GDP for the previous quarter) due to foreign
political events. The third is Hamilton’s (2003) indicator of oil price shocks, constructed as
the net oil price increase (in percentage terms) over the previous 3 years (at most).
In estimating the model, we restrict the sample period to 1996, the last year for which the
monetary shock measure (Romer and Romer, 2004) is available. In order to ensure suﬃcient
propagation of shocks, we include 8 lags for both the inter-industry spillover variables and
the macroeconomic shocks. Finally, all explanatory variables are normalized to unit variance
after setting the mean to zero, in order to facilitate comparison across shocks.
5.3. Results
Direct interpretation of the model parameters is diﬃcult in a binary response model
because the model is expressed as a nonlinear function of covariates. Therefore our discussion















18where Ti is the size of the eﬀective sample in which sit = 0 (not censored) for given i.23 The
detailed maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters are provided in Table A1.
Using these estimates, Figure 7 plots the cumulative impacts of a one-standard-deviation
increase in the explanatory variables, together with the 68% and 95% conﬁdence bands.24
Panel A exhibits the upstream spillover eﬀects for the occurrences of peaks and troughs.
Looking at peaks, in response to a one-standard-deviation increase in the fraction of upstream
industries (output users) that experienced a peak in the previous quarter, the probability of
an industry experiencing a peak increases by 2%. The cumulative eﬀects of this upstream
spillover eﬀect continue to rise for seven quarters, suggesting a gradual but strong upstream
propagation through the input-output linkages. For troughs, the upstream spillover eﬀect
becomes statistically positive only with a two quarters delay, and then begins to fade out
after four quarters.
Panel B shows that the downstream spillover eﬀect is also signiﬁcant. Having more
downstream industries (input suppliers) experiencing phase shifts also increases the indus-
try’s probability of experiencing a phase shift. In peaks, both upstream and downstream
eﬀects are signiﬁcant and in similar magnitudes. For troughs, unlike the upstream eﬀect, the
downstream eﬀect is not only immediately signiﬁcant but also gradually strengthens over
time, reaching its maximum eﬀect after seven quarters. Overall, in troughs, the downstream
eﬀect seems stronger than the upstream eﬀect.
Panel C plots the cumulative eﬀects of monetary policy shocks, identiﬁed by Romer
and Romer (2004). Consistent with the prediction from the standard monetary models, an
exogenous increase in the federal funds rate increases the probability of a peak (the end of
expansion) and decreases the probability of a trough (the end of contraction). Of importance
is its asymmetric eﬀect between peaks and troughs. For peaks, a one-standard-deviation
23For example, the marginal eﬀect of the kth explanatory variable on the probability of i industry’s
experiencing a phase shift at time t is calculated as k(X0
it + i), where k is the coeﬃcient on the kth
explanatory variable and () is the standard normal density.
24Because no lags of the dependent variable are included in the model, the cumulative eﬀect after m
quarters is just the sum of the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst m lags of the explanatory variables.
19increase in the federal funds rate increases the probability of an industry experiencing a
peak by 0.6% in the ﬁrst quarter. While the probability of a peak slightly increases during
the following two quarters, such responses are mostly small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
In contrast, the probability of a trough exhibits rapid, persistent, and large declines after a
rise in the federal funds rate. The cumulative impact is between -6.6% and -9.2% for the
ﬁrst four quarters, and then declines again, reaching -17.5% at the seventh quarter. The
estimated impact is consistently signiﬁcant even at the 95% conﬁdence level. According to
these results, monetary policy is highly eﬀective in recessions: a decrease in the federal funds
rate increases the probability of exiting a recession signiﬁcantly. This asymmetric pattern
is consistent with the view that the eﬀect of monetary policy on output growth is greater in
recessions than in expansions; e.g., Weise (1999), Lo and Piger (2005), and Peersman and
Smets (2005).
Government policy shocks, measured by Ramey (forthcoming), have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on both peaks and troughs (Panel D). Their eﬀects are also somewhat asymmetric. An
exogenous increase in government spending reduces the probability of a peak (the end of
expansion). The cumulative eﬀect reaches -7.0% in the ﬁfth quarter, and then returns toward
zero. For troughs, increased government spending signiﬁcantly increases the probability of
exiting a contraction phase, with the maximum eﬀect being estimated at 14.9% in the fourth
quarter. Hence, the eﬀect of government spending on the occurrence of a phase shift in
recessions is almost twice as large as that in expansions. This result is consistent with the
recent theoretical (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2009; Woodford, forthcoming) and
empirical (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010; Bachmann and Sims, 2011) work that ﬁnds
a larger government spending multiplier in recessions using aggregate-level time-series data.
Finally, Panel E shows that oil price shocks, measured by Hamilton (2003), are also
important determinants for industry phase shifts. A one-standard-deviation increase in oil
price raises the propensity of a transition from expansion to contraction, with its maximum
eﬀect being 7.6% in the fourth quarter. The same magnitude of change in oil price lowers
20the probability of exiting a recession with its maximum eﬀect of -15.8% in the third quarter
after.25
In sum, both the input-output linkages and the three macroeconomic shocks we consider
are important determinants of industrial phase shifts over the business cycle. All of them
are statistically signiﬁcant and conform with our economic priors. Moreover, they show
interesting asymmetry between peaks and troughs. In particular, both monetary and ﬁscal
policy shocks are more eﬀective during recessions.
5.4. Robustness
In this subsection we examine whether our conclusions are robust to alternative data and
model speciﬁcations. The results are summarized in Figure 8. In our baseline estimation, we
use Hamilton’s (2003) measure of oil price shocks, which is constructed in nominal terms and
does not distinguish underlying causes of the oil price changes. We re-estimate the probit
model using Kilian’s (2008) measure of oil price shocks that captures real oil price changes
driven solely by supply-side disruptions in the crude oil market.26 Our results are generally
robust to this alternative measure of oil price shocks. One notable exception is the eﬀect of
government spending shocks on the occurrence of a trough: it is much weaker with Kilian’s
measure.
We also estimate the model using data disaggregated at the 3-digit NAICS level.27 The
use of 3-digit data yields somewhat imprecise estimates with respect to both spillover eﬀects,
as the number of observations decreases. However, interestingly, the eﬀects of macroeconomic
shocks are much more pronounced, perhaps because they are aggregate common shocks. In
25Our results for the eﬀects of oil price shocks do not necessarily conﬂict with the conventional view that
an oil price increase has a larger output eﬀect than an oil price decrease; Hamilton (2003) and references
therein. The reason is clear because an asymmetry related to the direction of an oil price change does not
imply nor is it implied by an asymmetry related to the responses of peaks and troughs to a given change in
oil price.
26We obtain the real oil price shocks as the regression residuals of the growth rate of the real oil price on
the contemporaneous and up to four lags of exogenous oil supply changes documented by Kilian (2008). The
real price of oil is obtained by deﬂating the price of crude oil based on the price index for GDP.
27The results of using the 6-digit industry-level data are virtually identical to those reported for the 4-digit
industries.
21particular, the use of 3-digit data considerably increases the eﬀects of government spending
shocks on the occurrence of a trough. To check whether applying a detrending method would
yield diﬀerent results, we also estimate the model using the 4-digit data detrended by the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The results are quite robust even to this alternative choice.
In our baseline model of random eﬀects we implicitly assume that industry-speciﬁc factors
do not aﬀect the probabilities of phase shifts. This assumption might be too restrictive. To
address this problem, we allow industry-speciﬁc disturbances, denoted as it in equation
(7), to follow a stationary ﬁrst-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process.28 As is clear in the
ﬁgure, the results are fairly robust to this generalization. We also consider a ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcation to take into account the possibility that the mean durations of expansion phases
of industries, which are closely related to their trend growth rates (Harding and Pagan,
2002), may not be independent from the explanatory variables, which account for cyclical
movements of industries.29 To correct the bias due to the incidental parameters problem, we
estimate the ﬁxed eﬀects model using the penalized-likelihood-based approximation proposed
by Bester and Hansen (2009). Again, the results are very similar to those of the random
eﬀects model.
Finally, to check the robustness of our results to structural changes in the input-output
linkages during the sample period, we use the 1977 input-output table that is broken down
by the SIC codes. In addition, in order to match this input-output table with IP data, we
also make use of the vintage IP data disaggregated by the same SIC codes.30 Despite large
time gaps between the two input-output tables, the results do not alter signiﬁcantly. This
evidence is consistent with Carvalho (2010), Holly and Petrella (2010), and Foerster, Sarte
and Watson (forthcoming), who ﬁnd that the observed changes in the structure of input-
output relations do not seem to substantially distort the eﬀects of the sources of industry
28We estimate the model using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator; Lee (1997) for details
of the procedure.
29We note that there is a long-standing debate in economics regarding the relationship between long-term
trends and short-term ﬂuctuations in economic variables.
30The vintage IP data are constructed by Foerster, Sarte and Watson (forthcoming), and available from
Mark Watson’s website. We use the vintage IP data disaggregated into 84 industries.
22comovement.
6. Summary
The phase shift carries far richer information about the nature of business cycles than a
simple correlation. In particular, the timing of turning points is of great interest to policy
makers, ﬁnancial analysts, and individual investors. Based on the IP indices of 74 U.S. man-
ufacturing industries, we identify the turning points of industry cycles using a nonparametric
method developed by Harding and Pagan (2002).
We uncover new empirical regularities about the inter-industry comovement of turning
points that will help us to better understand the nature of business cycles. First, manufac-
turing industries on average have experienced more cycles than the U.S. aggregate economy.
Second, the comovement across industries appears to be a salient feature of manufacturing
business cycles. Third and most important, there is substantial asymmetry in the distri-
bution of turning points between peaks and troughs. Troughs (upturns) are much more
concentrated than peaks (downturns). Occurrences of phase shifts across industries strongly
support the spillovers through input-output linkages, a core aspect of multi-sector models.
We conﬁrm that the standard macroeconomic shocks, such as exogenous changes in the
federal funds rate, defense spending, and oil prices, are important determinants of cyclical
turning points. Their eﬀects on industry phase shifts are all statistically signiﬁcant and con-
form with our economic priors. Finally, we ﬁnd that both monetary and ﬁscal policy shocks
are much more eﬀective in recessions than in expansions.
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NBER cycle 5.0 27.4 23.8 3.8 6.2
Industry cycles
Mean 10.3 14.2 8.7 5.3 1.8
Median 10.0 13.5 7.6 5.1 1.5
Max 16.0 34.0 31.3 8.9 10.4
Min 4.0 8.3 3.8 2.6 0.5
Std. 2.5 4.5 4.3 1.3 1.5
Note: Complete cycles are measured from trough to trough.







Note: ‘Pairwise’ measures the concordance between industries.
‘NBER’ measures the concordance of industries with the aggre-
gate U.S. economy whose turning points are determined by the
NBER.
29Table 3. Transition Probability
Current
Previous Leading Coincident Lagging Acyclical
(A) For Peaks
Leading 0.613 0.131 0.157 0.100
Coincident 0.554 0.089 0.179 0.179
Lagging 0.547 0.187 0.107 0.160
Acyclical 0.500 0.167 0.146 0.188
(B) For Troughs
Leading 0.300 0.338 0.263 0.100
Coincident 0.256 0.336 0.296 0.112
Lagging 0.185 0.346 0.346 0.123
Acyclical 0.371 0.171 0.286 0.171
Note: The ijth element indicates the probability of moving from group i
at the previous NBER peak (trough) to group j at the current NBER peak
(trough).
30Table 4. Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Industries at the NBER Peak Dates
Code Dur. Industry title Prob. Leads (-) or lags (+)
Mean Std.
Leading industries
3322 D Cutlery and handtool 1.00 -3.00 1.41
3361 D Motor vehicle 1.00 -3.00 1.79
3371 D Furniture and kitchen cabinet 1.00 -1.83 1.17
3325 D Hardware 0.83 -4.40 2.07
3362 D Motor vehicle body and trailer 0.83 -4.40 2.70
3255 ND Paint, coating, and adhesive 0.83 -3.80 2.68
3212 D Veneer, plywood, and engineered wood product 0.83 -3.60 2.07
3219 D Other wood product 0.83 -3.40 1.95
3221 ND Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 0.83 -3.40 2.30
3352 D Household appliance 0.83 -3.00 2.35
3274 D Lime and gypsum product 0.83 -3.00 2.92
3252 ND Resin, synth. rubber, ﬁbers, and ﬁlaments 0.83 -2.80 1.64
3253 ND Pestic., fertil., and agric. chemical 0.83 -2.60 2.07
3351 D Electric lighting equipment 0.83 -2.40 1.34
3372A9 D Oﬃce and other furniture 0.83 -2.20 1.30
3315 D Foundries 0.67 -4.75 2.87
3211 D Sawmills and wood preservation 0.67 -4.50 2.08
3363 D Motor vehicle parts 0.67 -4.50 2.08
3122 ND Tobacco 0.67 -4.25 3.77
3334 D Ventilat., heat., air-cond., and refrig. equip. 0.67 -4.00 2.16
3149 ND Other textile product mills 0.67 -4.00 2.45
3118 ND Bakeries and tortilla 0.67 -4.00 2.94
3133 ND Textile and fabr. ﬁnishing and fabr. coating mills 0.67 -3.75 1.26
3343 D Audio and video equipment 0.67 -3.75 1.71
3131 ND Fiber, yarn, and thread mills 0.67 -3.75 2.36
3353 D Electrical equipment 0.67 -3.75 2.36
3273 D Cement and concrete product 0.67 -3.25 1.50
3329 D Other fabricated metal product 0.67 -3.25 3.30
3279 D Other nonmetallic mineral product 0.67 -3.00 2.12
3141 ND Textile furnishings mills 0.67 -2.25 0.50
Lagging industries
3113 ND Sugar and confectionery product 0.67 1.50 1.00
3345 D Navig., measur., electromed., and contr. instr. 0.67 2.50 1.29
Note: ‘D’ and ‘ND’ stand for durables and nondurables, respectively. ‘Prob.’ denotes the unconditional
probability of being classiﬁed in a group at a NBER peak. ‘Mean’ and ‘Std.’ are the conditional mean and
standard deviation of leads or lags at the NBER peaks, given that the industry belongs to the speciﬁed
group.
31Table 5. Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Industries at the NBER Trough Dates
Code Dur. Industry title Prob. Leads (-) or lags (+)
Mean Std.
Leading industries
3391 D Medical equipment and supplies 0.67 -3.50 3.32
3113 ND Sugar and confectionery product 0.67 -3.20 2.28
3211 D Sawmills and wood preservation 0.67 -3.00 2.45
Coincident industries
3149 ND Other textile product mills 0.83 0.00 0.00
3325 D Hardware 0.83 0.00 0.00
3311A2 D Iron and steel products 0.83 0.00 0.00
3132 ND Fabric mills 0.67 0.00 0.00
3133 ND Textile and fabr. ﬁnishing and fabr. coating mills 0.67 0.00 0.00
3327 D Machine shop; screw, nut, and bolt 0.67 0.00 0.00
3371 D Furniture and kitchen cabinet 0.67 0.00 0.00
3261 ND Plastics product 0.67 0.00 0.00
3272 D Glass and glass product 0.67 0.00 0.00
3315 D Foundries 0.67 0.00 0.00
Lagging industries
3333A9 D Commercial and service industry machinery 0.83 1.80 1.30
3336 D Engine, turbine, and power trans. equipment 0.83 2.40 2.61
3118 ND Bakeries and tortilla 0.83 2.40 2.61
3353 D Electrical equipment 0.83 2.80 2.39
3256 ND Soap, cleaning compound, and toilet preparation 0.83 3.00 2.55
3345 D Navig., measur., electromed., and contr. instr. 0.67 2.25 1.50
3321 D Forging and stamping 0.67 2.75 0.96
3331 D Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery 0.67 2.75 2.06
3122 ND Tobacco 0.67 3.00 1.41
3111 ND Animal food 0.67 3.00 1.41
3335 D Metalworking machinery 0.67 3.20 2.77
3365 D Railroad rolling stock 0.67 4.50 2.38
Note: See footnote of Table 4.
32Table 6. Sharpness Asymmetry for Each Group of Industries
Peaks Troughs Sharpness asymmetry
DP; 2 DP;+2 SP DT; 2 DT;+2 ST (ST   SP)
Total -0.003 -0.046 0.062 -0.077 0.038 0.126 0.065
Coincident 0.034 -0.063 0.097 -0.120 0.089 0.209 0.112
Others -0.009 -0.043 0.056 -0.056 0.012 0.085 0.029
Leading -0.029 -0.068 0.059 -0.020 0.055 0.096 0.037
Lagging 0.034 0.013 0.049 -0.083 -0.018 0.083 0.035
Acyclical 0.003 -0.031 0.056 -0.035 0.024 0.070 0.013
Note: For peaks, DP; 2 and DP;+2 indicate the mean changes in the log IP during the two quarters ending in
the NBER peak dates and those during the two quarters following the NBER peak dates. SP measures the
mean sharpness of the log IP at the NBER peak date, deﬁned as the absolute diﬀerence between DP; 2 and
DP;+2. For troughs, DT; 2, DT;+2, and ST are deﬁned in a similar way. Sharpness asymmetry is measured
by the diﬀerence between ST and SP. Asterisk indicates that the Welch t-test rejects the null of no sharpness
asymmetry at the 5% level or less.
Table 7. Decomposition of Sharpness Asymmetry
NBER recessions ST   SP Composition eﬀect (%) Individual asymmetry (%)
1973–75 0.151 0.030 (19.5) 0.122 (80.5)
1980 0.045 0.010 (22.5) 0.035 (77.5)
1981–82 0.028 0.003 (9.2) 0.026 (90.8)
1990–91 0.029 0.014 (48.5) 0.015 (51.5)
2001 0.022 0.017 (74.6) 0.006 (25.4)
2007–09 0.112 0.022 (19.3) 0.090 (80.7)
Mean 0.065 0.016 (24.3) 0.049 (75.7)
Note: The second column shows sharpness asymmetry at the aggregate level, estimated for each NBER
recession. ‘Composition eﬀect’ corresponds to the sharpness asymmetry due to changes in the fraction of
coincident and other industries. ‘Individual asymmetry’ corresponds to the sharpness asymmetry attributed
to the changes in sharpness for each group of industries between NBER troughs and peaks. The values in
parentheses are the share of sharpness asymmetry (in percentage terms) explained by each source.
33Table A.1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Models for Industry Phase Shifts
Variable Peak equation Trough equation
Lag Index coeﬃcient AME Index coeﬃcient AME
Upstream spillover
t   1 0.105 (0.030) 0.021 (0.007) 0.010 (0.040) 0.003 (0.012)
t   2 0.036 (0.034) 0.007 (0.007) 0.178 (0.045) 0.049 (0.013)
t   3 0.022 (0.036) 0.004 (0.008) 0.000 (0.054) 0.000 (0.016)
t   4 0.039 (0.035) 0.008 (0.008) 0.012 (0.056) 0.003 (0.017)
t   5 0.025 (0.033) 0.005 (0.007) -0.098 (0.051) -0.027 (0.015)
t   6 0.061 (0.033) 0.012 (0.007) -0.062 (0.042) -0.017 (0.013)
t   7 0.015 (0.034) 0.003 (0.007) -0.031 (0.042) -0.009 (0.013)
t   8 -0.044 (0.036) -0.009 (0.008) 0.029 (0.043) 0.008 (0.013)
Downstream spillover
t   1 0.124 (0.030) 0.024 (0.007) 0.116 (0.041) 0.032 (0.012)
t   2 0.021 (0.035) 0.004 (0.008) 0.000 (0.048) 0.000 (0.014)
t   3 0.020 (0.037) 0.004 (0.008) 0.047 (0.051) 0.013 (0.015)
t   4 0.040 (0.036) 0.008 (0.008) 0.017 (0.055) 0.005 (0.016)
t   5 -0.010 (0.035) -0.002 (0.008) 0.006 (0.049) 0.002 (0.015)
t   6 -0.061 (0.036) -0.012 (0.008) 0.099 (0.045) 0.027 (0.013)
t   7 0.023 (0.034) 0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.047) 0.001 (0.014)
t   8 -0.033 (0.037) -0.007 (0.008) -0.137 (0.051) -0.038 (0.015)
Monetary policy shock
t   1 0.029 (0.041) 0.006 (0.009) -0.272 (0.041) -0.075 (0.011)
t   2 0.067 (0.041) 0.013 (0.009) 0.033 (0.054) 0.009 (0.016)
t   3 0.024 (0.041) 0.005 (0.009) -0.094 (0.051) -0.026 (0.015)
t   4 -0.101 (0.044) -0.020 (0.010) 0.065 (0.054) 0.018 (0.016)
t   5 0.014 (0.047) 0.003 (0.010) -0.283 (0.054) -0.078 (0.016)
t   6 0.033 (0.048) 0.006 (0.010) -0.083 (0.048) -0.023 (0.014)
t   7 0.165 (0.048) 0.033 (0.011) 0.001 (0.047) 0.000 (0.014)
t   8 -0.004 (0.041) -0.001 (0.009) 0.183 (0.047) 0.051 (0.014)
Government spending shock
t   1 -0.114 (0.036) -0.023 (0.008) 0.368 (0.054) 0.102 (0.017)
t   2 -0.098 (0.032) -0.019 (0.007) 0.075 (0.038) 0.021 (0.011)
t   3 -0.084 (0.035) -0.017 (0.008) 0.087 (0.045) 0.024 (0.014)
t   4 -0.015 (0.039) -0.003 (0.009) 0.009 (0.038) 0.003 (0.011)
t   5 -0.044 (0.041) -0.009 (0.009) -0.028 (0.041) -0.008 (0.012)
t   6 0.119 (0.044) 0.023 (0.010) -0.220 (0.043) -0.061 (0.013)
t   7 0.056 (0.045) 0.011 (0.010) -0.054 (0.044) -0.015 (0.013)
t   8 0.055 (0.054) 0.011 (0.012) 0.053 (0.047) 0.015 (0.014)
Oil price shock
t   1 0.020 (0.039) 0.004 (0.009) -0.063 (0.054) -0.017 (0.016)
t   2 0.267 (0.047) 0.053 (0.010) -0.206 (0.063) -0.057 (0.019)
t   3 0.092 (0.061) 0.018 (0.013) -0.289 (0.054) -0.080 (0.017)
t   4 0.006 (0.075) 0.001 (0.016) -0.014 (0.035) -0.004 (0.011)
t   5 -0.004 (0.053) -0.001 (0.011) 0.140 (0.040) 0.039 (0.012)
t   6 -0.100 (0.045) -0.020 (0.010) 0.099 (0.052) 0.028 (0.015)
t   7 -0.039 (0.037) -0.008 (0.008) -0.032 (0.056) -0.009 (0.017)
t   8 -0.085 (0.037) -0.017 (0.008) 0.104 (0.055) 0.029 (0.016)
Constant -1.108 (0.044) -0.706 (0.047)
 0.257 (0.042) 0.208 (0.051)
lnL -1277.8 -950.1
No. obs. 3588 1935
Notes: The estimated model is given by equations (6) and (7). Index coeﬃcients are the model parameters.
AME is the abbreviation for “Average Marginal Eﬀect.” The values in parentheses are asymptotic standard
errors. The asymptotic standard errors of index coeﬃcients are obtained from the inverse of the Hessian
at the maximum likelihood estimates, and those of AMEs are computed using the delta method. Asterisk
indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level or less.
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Note: ‘P’ and ‘T’ correspond to the peaks and troughs identiﬁed by the Harding-Pagan
method applied to the log level of U.S. real GDP. The shaded areas are recession periods
established by the NBER.
35Figure 2. Diffusion Indices for Cyclical Phases
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39Figure 7. The Cumulative Marginal Effects of a One-standard-deviation Increase
in the Explanatory Variables on the Probabilities of Industry Phase
Shifts













































































































































































C. Monetary policy shock
































































































C. Monetary policy shock























































































































C. Monetary Policy Shock







































































41Figure 8. Results of Various Sensitivity Exercises
(Baseline model: Hamilton’s oil price shocks, 4-digit classiﬁcation, Random eﬀects





































































































































































C. Monetary policy shock
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C. Monetary Policy Shock
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